Randomness extractors and error correcting codes are fundamental objects in computer science. Recently, there have been several natural generalizations of these objects, in the context and study of tamper resilient cryptography. These are seeded non-malleable extractors, introduced by Dodis and Wichs; seedless non-malleable extractors, introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami; and non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs. Besides being interesting on their own, they also have important applications in cryptography, e.g, privacy amplification with an active adversary, explicit non-malleable codes etc, and often have unexpected connections to their non-tampered analogues.
INTRODUCTION
Randomness extractors are fundamental objects in the study of randomness in computation. They are efficient algorithms that transform imperfect randomness into almost uniform random bits. Here we use the standard model of weak random source to model imperfect randomness. The min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as H∞(X) = min x∈Supp(X) log 2 (1/ Pr[X = x]). For a source X supported on {0, 1} n , we call X an (n, H∞(X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H∞(X)/n.
As one can show that no deterministic extractor works for all weak random sources even with min-entropy k = n − 1, randomness extractors are studied in two different settings. In one setting the extractor is given a short independent uniform random seed, and these extractors are called seeded extractors. Informally, a seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m for min-entropy k and error takes as input any (n, k) source X and a uniform seed S, and has the property that |Ext(X, S)−Um| < , where the distance used is the standard statistical distance. If the output of the extractor is guaranteed to be close to uniform even after seeing the value of the seed S, then it is called a strong seeded extractor. In the other setting there is no such random seed, but the source is assumed to have some special structure. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org.
These extractors are called seedless extractors (see full version of the paper for formal definitions). A special kind of seedless extractors that received a lot of attention is extractors for independent weak random sources. Here one can use the probabilistic method to show that such extractors exist for only two independent sources (such extractors are called two-source extractors).
Both kinds of extractors have been studied extensively, and shown to have many connections and applications in computer science. For example, seeded extractors can be used to simulate randomized algorithms with access to only weak random sources, and are closely related to pseudorandom generators, error-correcting code and expanders. Independent source extractors can be used to generate high quality random bits for distributed computing and cryptography [28] , [27] , and are closely related to Ramsey graphs and other seedless extractors.
In cryptographic applications, however, one faces a new situation where the inputs of an extractor may be tampered by an adversary. For example, an adversary may tamper with the seed of a seeded extractor, or both sources of a two-source extractor. In this case, one natural question is how the output of the tampered inputs will depend on the output of the initial inputs. In order to be resilient to adversarial tampering, one natural way is to require that the original output of the extractor be (almost) independent of the tampered output. This leads to the notion of non-malleable extractors, in both the seeded case and seedless case. These extractors not only are interesting in their own rights, but also have important applications in cryptography. Seeded non-malleable extractors were introduced by Dodis and Wichs in [17] , as a generalization of strong seeded extractors.
Definition 1.2 (Non-malleable extractor). A function snmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a seeded nonmalleable extractor for min-entropy k and error if the following holds : If X is a source on {0, 1} n with min-entropy k and A : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is an arbitrary tampering function with no fixed points, then
where Um is independent of U d and X.
The original motivation for seeded non-malleable extractors is to study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary. This is a basic problem in information theoretic cryptography, where two parties want to communicate with each other to convert their shared secret weak random source X into shared secret nearly uniform random bits. However, the communication channel is watched by an adversary Eve, where we assume Eve has unlimited computational power and the two parties have local (non-shared) uniform random bits.
In the case where Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them), this problem can be solved by just applying a strong seeded extractor. However, in the case where Eve is active (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages), the problem becomes much more complicated. The major goal here is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions as possible, and output a uniform random string R that has length as close to H∞(X) as possible (the difference is called entropy loss). There has been extensive research on this problem [36] , [14] , [17] , [41] , [29] , [6] , [15] , [13] , [30] , [31] . Along the line, a major progress was made by Dodis and Wichs [17] , who showed that seeded non-malleable extractors can be used to construct privacy amplification protocols with optimal round complexity and entropy loss.
This connection makes constructing non-malleable extractors a very promising approach to privacy amplification. However, all known constructions of such extractors ( [15] , [13] , [30] , [18] , [31] ) require the entropy of the weak source to be at least 0.49n. Moreover, all known constructions are essentially based on known two-source extractors, and the entropy requirement is exactly the same as the best known two-source extractor [5] .
In this work, we revive the original approach of constructing non-malleable extractors using alternating extraction [17] . We dramatically improve all previous results and give explicit seeded non-malleable extractors that work for any minentropy k ≥ log 2 n. We in fact consider a generalization, called as t-non-malleable extractors (introduced by Cohen et al. [13] ), where there are t tampering functions acting on the seed. We give explicit constructions of t-non-malleable extractors for min-entropy k = poly(t, log n).
We now discuss the seedless variant of non-malleable extractors. Cheraghchi and Guruswami [10] introduced seedless non-malleable extractors as a natural generalization of seeded non-malleable extractors. Furthermore, they found an elegant connection between seedless non-malleable extractors and non-malleable codes, which are a generalization of error-correcting codes to handle a much larger class of tampering functions (rather than just bit erasure or modification). Informally, non-malleable codes are w.r.t a family of tampering functions F, and require that the decoding of any codeword that is tampered by a function f ∈ F , is either the original message itself or something totally independent of the message (see Section 1.1). Non-malleable codes have also been extensively studied recently (we provide more details in Section 1.1), and Cheraghchi and Guruswami [10] showed a universal way of constructing explicit non-malleable codes by first constructing non-malleable seedless extractors.
In this paper we focus on one of the most interesting and well studied family of tampering functions, where the function tampers the original message independently in two separate parts. This is called the 2-split-state model (see Section 1.1 for a formal discussion). The corresponding seedless nonmalleable extractor is then a generalization of two-source extractors, where both sources can be tampered. For ease of presentation, we present a simplified definition here. Definition 1.3. (Seedless 2-Non-Malleable Extractor) A function nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a seedless 2-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error if it satisfies the following property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A = (f, g) is an arbitrary 2-split-state tampering function, such that at least one of f and g has no fixed points, then
where both Um's refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
Again, the connection in [10] makes constructing seedless 2-non-malleable extractors a very interesting and promising approach to non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model. However, no explicit constructions of 2-non-malleable extractors were known even when both sources are perfectly uniform. Indeed, finding an explicit construction of such extractors was left as an open problem in [10] , and none of the known constructions of seeded non-malleable extractors seem to satisfy this stronger notion. In this paper we solve this open problem and give the first explicit construction of 2-non-malleable extractors. Furthermore we show that given any output of the extractor, we can efficiently sample uniformly from its pre-image. By the connection in [10] this also gives explicit non-malleable codes in the above mentioned well studied 2-split-state model.
We note that our results about non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model do not improve the already nearly optimal construction in the recent work of Aggarwal et al.
[1]. However, our construction of seedless 2-non-malleable extractors is of independent interest, and provides a more direct way to construct non-malleable codes. 1 Finally, as in the case of seeded non-malleable extractors [13] , we consider the situation where the sources can be tampered many times. For this, we introduce a natural generalization of seedless 2-non-malleable extractors which we call seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors (i.e., the sources are tampered t times). Correspondingly, in the case of nonmalleable codes we also consider the situation where a codeword can be tampered many times. For this, we also introduce a natural generalization of non-malleable codes which we call one-many non-malleable codes (see Section 1.1). We initiate the study of these two objects in this paper and show that one-many non-malleable codes have several natural and interesting applications in cryptography.
We present a simplified definition of seedless (2, t)-nonmalleable extractors here, and refer the reader to the full version of the paper for the formal definition.
Definition 1.4. (Seedless (2,t)-Non-Malleable Extractor) A function nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error if it satisfies the following property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A1 = (f1, g1), . . . , At = (ft, gt) are t arbitrary 2-split-state tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} at least one of fi and gi has no fixed points, then
We provide explicit constructions of seedless (2, t)-nonmalleable extractors for t up to n δ for a small enough constant δ. Just as the connection between 2-non-malleable extractors and regular non-malleable codes, we show that these extractors lead to explicit constructions of one-many nonmalleable codes in the 2-split-state model. We note that as 1 In [1], non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model are constructed by giving efficient reductions from the 2-splitstate model to t-split-state model, and then using a known constructions of NM codes in the t-split-state model with almost optimal parameters [8] .
in the case of regular non-malleable codes, the construction based on (2, t)-non-malleable extractors may not be the only way to construct one-many non-malleable codes. However, it appears non-trivial to extend other existing constructions of non-malleable codes to satisfy this stronger notion. We discuss this in more details in the full version of the paper.
Subsequent Work.
In a recent work, Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [7] used our construction of seeded t-non-malleable extractors as a key component for explicitly constructing two-source extractors for polylogarithmic min-entropy. It was crucial to their construction that the min-entropy requirement and the seed-length of our t-non-malleable extractor are both poly(t, log n).
Non-malleable Codes
The notion of non-malleable codes (which we informally discussed in the previous section) was introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [22] as an elegant generalization of error-detecting codes to handle more severe forms of corruptions of codewords. Since the introduction of nonmalleable codes, there has been a flurry of recent work on finding explicit constructions, resulting in applications to tamper-resilient cryptography [22] , robust versions of secret sharing schemes [2] , and connections to the seemingly unrelated area of derandomization [10] .
We introduce natural generalizations of the notion of nonmalleable codes, which we call one-many and many-many non-malleable codes. These codes satisfy stronger notions of security which we discuss below.
First we define the replace function replace : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . If the second input to replace is a single value s, replace all occurrences of same in the first input with s and output the result. If the second input to replace is a set (s1, . . . , sn), replace all occurrences of same i in the first input with si for all i and output the result.
Definition 1.5 (Coding schemes). Let Enc : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n and Dec : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k ∪ {⊥} be functions such that Enc is a randomized function (i.e. it has access to a private randomness) and Dec is a deterministic function. We say that (Enc, Dec) is a coding scheme with block length n and message length k if for all s ∈ {0, 1} k , Pr[Dec(Enc(s)) = s] = 1 (the probability is over the randomness in Enc).
Definition 1.6 (Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc, Dec) with block length n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ Fn and error if for every f ∈ F there exists a random variable D f on {0, 1} k ∪ {same } which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1} k , it holds that
The rate of a non-malleable code C is given by k n . Observe that to construct non-malleable codes, it is still necessary to restrict the class of tampering functions since we cannot allow the tampering function to invert Enc. However as shown in [9] , the class of tampering functions can now be much richer than what was possible for error correction and error detection.
Tampering Multiple Codewords. Observe that the above definition envisions the adversary receiving a single codeword Enc(s) and outputting a single tampered codeword f (Enc(s)). We refer to this as the "one-one" setting. While indeed this is very basic, we argue that this does not capture scenarios where the adversary may be getting multiple codewords as input or be allowed to output multiple codewords. As an example, consider the following.
Say there is an auction where each party can submit its bid, and, the item goes to the highest bidder. An honest party, wishing to bid for value s, encodes its bid using NM codes and sends Enc(s). This indeed would prevent an adversary (which belongs to an appropriate class of tampering functions) from constructing his own bid by tampering Enc(s) and coming up with Enc(s + 1), which would completely compromise the sanity of the auction process. However what if the adversary can submit two bids out of which exactly one is guaranteed to be a winning bid? For example, the adversary can submit bids to r and 2s − r (for some r not known to the adversary). This is not ruled out by NM codes! Towards that end, we introduce a stronger notion which we call one-many NM codes. Intuitively, this guarantees the following. Consider the set of codewords output by the adversary. We require that even the joint distribution of the encoded value be independent of the value encoded in the input. A formal definition is given below:
Definition 1.7 (One-Many Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc, Dec) with block length n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ (Fn) t and error if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F, there exists a random variable D f on ({0, 1} k ∪ {same }) t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1} k , it holds that |(Dec(f1(X)), . . . , Dec(ft(X))) − replace(D f , s)| ≤ Where X = Enc(s). We refer to t as the tampering degree of the non-malleable code.
Thus one-many non-malleable codes is a natural more robust version of the well studied notion of non-malleable codes, and can be used in all applications of non-malleable codes in tamper-resilient cryptography with this stronger form of security.
An expert in cryptography by now would have noticed that this is analogous to the well studied notion of one-many non-malleable commitments [37] . Even though both notions deal with related concerns, we note non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitment are fundamentally different objects with the latter necessarily based on complexity assumptions. To start with, we observe a simple impossibility result for one-many non-malleable codes (whereas for one-many non-malleable commitments, a corresponding positive result is known [37] ). We refer the reader to the full version for a proof.
Lemma 1.8. One-many non-malleable codes which work for any arbitrary tampering degree and < 1/4 cannot exist for a large class of tampering functions.
We also introduce a natural generalization which we call many-many non-malleable codes. This refers to the situation where the adversary is given multiple codewords as input. Definition 1.9 (Many-Many Non-malleable code). A coding scheme (Enc, Dec) with block length n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ (Fn) t and error if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F, there exists a random variable D f on
t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all vector of messages (s1, . . . , su), si ∈ {0, 1} k , we have |(Dec(f1( X)), . . . , Dec(ft( X)))−replace(D f , (s1, . . . , su))| ≤ Where Xi = Enc(si) and X = (X1, . . . , Xu)
The following lemma relates one-many non-malleable codes to many-many non-malleable codes. This lemma is analogous to a similar lemma for non-malleable commitments [37] . The proof is via a straightforward hybrid argument, and we refer the reader to the full version for more details.
Lemma 1.10. One-many non-malleable codes with tampering degree t and error are also many-many non-malleable codes for tampering degree t and error u (where u is as in Definition 1.9).
Relation to Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
A primitive related to one-many non-malleable codes that we introduce, known as continuous non-malleable codes, was introduced by Faust et al. [23] . Informally, in a continuous non-malleable code, the codewords are allowed to be tampered multiple times (without allowing fresh encoding of the message), with the additional guarantee that the tampering experiment stops (called "self destruct") whenever an error message is detected. This model is weaker than the notion we consider since we do not allow for such a self-destruct option. Moreover, the work of [23] is based on computational assumptions. However, it allows for an unbounded number of tamperings.
The work of Jafargholi and Wichs [26] studied variants of continuous non-malleable codes, such as whether the tampering is persistent or non-persistent (i.e., whether the new tampering is on the current tampered codeword or the original codeword), and whether the self-destruct option is available.
It was shown in [23] that continuous non-malleable codes against unbounded tampering in the non-persistent model cannot exist in the information theoretic setting. Subsequently, the work of [26] proved the existence of continuous non-malleable codes against unbounded tampering in the persistent model (with self-destruct) in the information theoretic setting. Following this, in a recent work Aggarwal, Kazana and Ombreski [3] provided explicit constructions of such codes.
Thus, our result on one-many non-malleable codes can be interpreted as an explicit construction of continuous nonmalleable codes in the non-persistent model (without selfdestruct) against a bounded tampering in the informationtheoretic model. We note that as implied by the result of [23] , one cannot hope to handle unbounded tampering in this model in the information theoretic setting.
Non-malleable Codes in the Split-State Model An important and well studied family of tampering functions (which is also relevant to the current work) is the family of tampering functions in the C-split-state model, for C ≥ 2. In this model, each tampering function f is of the form (f1, . . . , fC ) where fi ∈ F n/C , and for any codeword x = (x1, . . . , xC ) ∈ ({0, 1} n/C ) C we define (f1, . . . , fC )(x1, . . . , xC ) = (f1(x1), . . . , fC (xC )). Thus each fi independently tampers a fixed partition of the codeword. Non-malleable codes in this model can also be viewed as non-malleable secret sharing. This is because the strings (x1, . . . , xC ) can be seen as the shares of s and tampering each share individually does not allow one to "maul" the shared secret s.
There has been a lot of recent work on constructing explicit and efficient non malleable codes in the C-split-state model. Since C = 1 includes all of Fn, the best one can hope for is C = 2. A Monte-Carlo (inefficient) construction of non-malleable codes in this model was given in [22] for C = 2 and improved in [9] . By a recent line of work [20] [2] [10] [8] [1], we now have almost optimal constructions of non-malleable codes in the C-state-state model, for any C ≥ 2.
Many-many non-malleable secret sharing. Consider the example of non-malleable secret sharing [2] . What if there are shares of multiple secrets which the adversary can tamper with? What if the adversary is allowed to output shares of multiple secrets? For example, say there are two secret and two devices. Each device stores one share of each of the secrets. Say that an adversary is able to tamper with the data stored on each device individually (or infect each of them with a virus). Then, the current notion of oneone NM codes does not rule out a non-trivial relationship between two resulting secrets and the two original secrets we start with. It is conceivable that what we need here is a two-two non-malleable secret sharing. Our many-many non-malleable codes directly lead to such a many-many nonmalleable secret sharing scheme.
Summary of Results
Our first main result is an explicit construction of a (2, t)seedless non-malleable extractor. We note that prior to this work, such a construction was not known for even t = 1 and full min-entropy.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ n γ , there exists an efficient seedless (2, t)-NM extractor at min-entropy n − n γ with error 2 −n Ω(1) and output length m = n Ω(1) .
We refer the reader to the full version for a proof of the above theorem.
Next, we show that it is possible to efficiently sample almost uniformly from the pre-image of any output of this extractor. Combining this with the connection to non-malleable codes and a hybrid argument, we immediately have the following result. We refer the reader to the full version for more details.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ n γ , there exists an efficient construction of one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model with tampering degree t, relative rate n Ω(1) /n, and error 2 −n Ω(1) .
We next improve the min-entropy requirements of seeded non-malleable extractors. As mentioned above, previously the best known construction requires min-entropy rate 0.49 [31] . We have the following result.
Theorem 3. There exists a constant c such that for all n > 0 and > 0, and k ≥ c log 2 n , there exists an explicit construction of a seeded non-malleable extractor snmExt :
Our construction is actually more general and can handle t-adversarial functions, improving the result of [13] .
Theorem 4. There exists a constant c such that for all n, t ∈ N and > 0, and k ≥ ct log 2 n , there exists an explicit construction of a seeded non-malleable extractor snmExt :
As discussed above, this t-non-malleable extractor was crucial for the construction of two-source extractors for polylogarithmic min-entropy by Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [7] .
Combined with the protocol developed in [17] , this immediately gives the following result about privacy amplification, which matches the best known result in [34] but has a simpler protocol.
Theorem 5. There exists a constant C such that for any ε > 0 with k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ε)) 2 , there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol with an active adversary for (n, k) sources, with security parameter log(1/ε) and entropy loss O(log n + log(1/ε)).
Related work on privacy amplification.
The goal of privacy amplification is roughly as follows. Given a security parameter s, if the adversary Eve remains passive during the protocol then the two parties should achieve shared secret random bits that are 2 −s -close to uniform. On the other hand, if Eve is active, then the probability that Eve can successfully make the two parties output two different strings without being detected is at most 2 −s . We refer the readers to [15] for a formal definition.
The major goal here is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions as possible, and output a uniform random string R that has length as close to k = H∞(X) as possible (the difference is called entropy loss). There has been a long line of research [36] , [14] , [17] , [41] , [29] , [6] , [15] , [13] , [30] , [31] . However, all protocols before the work of [15] either need to use O(s) rounds, or need to incur an entropy loss of O(s 2 ). After the introduction of seeded nonmalleable extractors in [17] , subsequent works [15] , [13] , [30] , [31] achieved 2-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss O(s) in the case where k ≥ δn for any constant δ > 0.
In a different line of work, Li [30] introduced the notion of non-malleable condenser, which is a weaker object than seeded non-malleable extractor. He then constructed explicit non-malleable condensers for entropy as small as k = polylog(n) in [34] and used them to give the first tworound privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss O(s), subject to the constraint that k ≥ s 2 .
Organization
We present an outline of all our constructions in Section 2. We use Section 3 to introduce some preliminaries. Finally, in Section 4, we present our construction of a seeded nonmalleable extractor for polylogarithmic min-entropy.
OVERVIEW OF OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we give a detailed outline of our constructions. We keep the presentation sufficiently informal to present the main ideas involved while avoiding various technicalities.
A Seedless (2, t)-Non-malleable Extractor
Throughout this section we assume that both sources X and Y have min-entropy n − n γ for some small constant 0 < γ < 1. We introduce some notation.
Notation: For any function H, and V = H(X, Y ), we use V (i) to denote the random variable H(Ai(X, Y )). If Za, Za+1, . . . , Z b are random variables, we use Z [a,b] to denote the random variable (Za, . . . , Z b ). For any bit string z, let z {h} denote the symbol in the h'th co-ordinate of x. For a string x of length m, and T ⊆ [m], let x {T } be the projection of x onto the co-ordinates indexed by T . For a string x of length m, define the string Slice(x, w) to be the prefix of x with length w.
To construct seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors, our crucial observation is that while many other techniques in constructing seeded non-malleable extractors (such as those in [15] , [13] , [31] ) fail in the case where both sources are tampered, the powerful technique of alternating extraction, introduced by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [21] , and subsequently used in [17] [30] , [31] , [33] , [32] , [35] still works. Specifically, if we use X and Y to do an alternating extraction and output a sequence of random variables R1, · · · , Ru, then even if both sources are tampered t times, for any i we can show that Ri+1 is close to uniform even conditioned on all {R j 1 , · · · , R j i , j ∈ [t]}. Moreover, if we can produce a short string string Z, which we call a tag, from X and Y such that Z is different from all {Z j , j ∈ [t]}, then we can use ideas similar to those in [32] to gradually break the dependence of the output from (X, Y ) on the outputs from {Ai(X, Y )}, until at the end the output from (X, Y ) is independent of the outputs from {Ai(X, Y )}. More recently, based on the techniques in [32] , Cohen [12] made this more precise by defining "local correlation breakers", and introduced a new way of alternating extraction called "flip-flop" alternating extraction. Using this, our construction will proceed bit by bit from the tag Z, and for each bit Z {h} we use two sub steps of alternating extraction. In the first sub step we produce R h,1 , R h,2 , and if Z {h} = 0 we choose V h = R h,1 ; otherwise we choose V h = R h,2 . We then use V h to start the second sub step of alternating extraction, where we produce R h,1 , R h,2 . Now we flip the choices and if the Z {h} = 0, we choose V h = R h,2 ; otherwise we choose V h = R h,1 and we use V h to start the next step of alternating extraction. Using similar ideas as in [12] , it can be shown that whenever we hit a bit where Z {h} = Z j {h} , the output in this step of alternating extraction from (X, Y ) will be independent of the output from Aj(X, Y ), and this independence will continue to hold in subsequent steps. Therefore at the end the output from (X, Y ) will be independent of the outputs from all {Aj(X, Y )}. This gives our (2, t)-non-malleable extractors.
We now describe how to obtain the short tag Z. We first take two small slices X1 and Y1 from the sources X and Y respectively, with size say 3n γ ; and use the strong inner product 2-source extractor IP to generate an almost uniform random variable V = IP(X1, Y1). Now we take an explicit asymptotically good binary linear error correcting code, and obtain encodings (E(X), E(Y )) of (X, Y ) respectively. We now use V to randomly sample n Ω(1) bits from E(X) to obtain X2, and from E(Y ) to obtain Y2.
The length of Z is = n β bits for some small constant β. Fix some i ∈ [t]. We claim that Z = Z (i) with probability at least 1 − 2 −n Ω(1)
. To see this, assume without loss of generality that fi has no fixed points. If X1 = X
. We fix X1, since IP is a strong extractor, V is still close to uniform and now it is a function of Y , and thus independent of X. Since X = X (i) , by the property of the code, we know that E(X) and E(X (i) ) must differ in at least a constant fraction of coordinates. Thus, if we randomly sample n Ω(1) bits from these coordinates, then with probability 1 − 2 −n Ω(1) the sampled strings will be different.
We can now fix Z,
Since the size of each Z (i) is small, we have that conditioned on this fixing, the sources X and Y are still independent and have min-entropy at least n − O(t ) each (with high probability). This is enough for alternating extraction.
The seeded non-malleable extractor follows by a simple modification. Notice that now one source (say X) is not tampered and the other source is uniform. So we can just take a small slice Y1 from Y and apply a strong seeded extractor to X to get V = Ext(X, Y1). We then use V to sample randomly a short string Y2 from some asymptotically good encoding of Y . Now let Z = Y1 • Y2, and the same argument above will give that with high probability Z = Z i for all i ∈ [t].
Comparison to the LCB in [12] : Our construction of (2, t)-non-malleable extractor uses the idea of "flip-flop" alternating extraction from [12] . However, we point out that there are some differences between our construction and the "Local Correlation Breaker" in [12] .
First, in our construction, both sources X and Y are tampered. This results in t random variables X (1) , . . . , X (t) that are arbitrarily correlated with X, and t random variables Y (1) , . . . , Y (t) that are arbitrarily correlated with Y . In contrast, in [12] , only one source has correlated random variables, and the other source is not tampered. In this sense, our construction can actually be viewed as a stronger version of LCB.
Second, the way to obtain a string that distinguishes the correlated parts is quite different. In the case of LCB, one can simply use the index of each row in the somewhere random source. In contrast, in our case we do not have such an index, since we only have access to the two sources X and Y . Thus, we have to first create such a string from these two sources, by using error correcting codes and random sampling.
Connection to cryptographic non-malleable commitments In our constructions, we first generate a short "unique" tag from X and Y . Then, very roughly, our construction proceeds in multiple stage with each stage dependent on a particular bit of the tag. Independence (or non-malleability) is achieved in a stage where the corresponding bit of the tag is different from the tag for the tampered execution. This idea can be seen as inspired partly from the literature on non-malleable commitments. In particular, the seminal pa-per introducing non-malleability by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [19] used such an idea. Further, observe that in our construction we gain independence from a particular adversary in a single (unknown) stage (when the bit in the tampered tag is 0 and the non-tampered bit is 1). Such ideas were also used in constructions of non-malleable commitment protocols in works of Pass and Rosen [38] , and Goyal [24] .
Efficient Algorithms for Many-many Nonmalleable Codes
The above construction gives a (2, t) non-malleable extractor. For our application to constructing explicit many-many non-malleable codes, given any output of the extractor we need to efficiently sample (almost) uniformly from its preimage (i.e., "inverting" the extractor). To do this using the construction described above is highly non-trivial. Therefore, we use additional ideas to modify the non-malleable extractor to make this easier. Recall t is the number of tampered versions of the sources, and is the length of string Z.
Idea 1: Since our construction of the (2, t) non-malleable extractor involves multiple steps of alternating extraction, we need to first invert the extractors used in these steps. For this purpose, we use linear seeded strong extractors in all alternating extraction steps. A linear seeded extractor is an extractor such that for any fixed seed, the output is a linear function of the input. Thus we can efficiently sample uniformly from an output's pre-image by solving a system of linear equations. Idea 2: We will avoid using the same string twice in our alternating extraction steps. To do so, we will divide the sources X and Y , and any intermediate random variables which will be used more than once in alternating extraction into blocks. Each time we apply a seeded extractor, we will use a completely new block of the corresponding random variable. This ensures that we do not have to deal with multiple compositions of extractors on the same string. That is, different applications of extractors are used on different parts of the inputs; so to invert them we can invert each part separately.
Here, we need to choose the parameters appropriately. Let the size of each R h,j produced in alternating extraction be roughly d. In the analysis of the entire non-malleable extractor, we need to fix O(t ) such intermediate random variables. The total size of this is O(t d). Thus we can take all t, , d to be some small enough n Ω(1) such that the total entropy loss of X and Y is some small n Ω(1) . Note that X and Y initially have almost full entropy. Therefore, we can divide X and Y into O( ) blocks (or even O(t ) blocks, for some technical reason), such that even conditioned on the fixing of all the intermediate random variables and all previous blocks, each block still has entropy rate say at least 0.9 (this can be achieved as long as n/(t ) t d). This ensures that each time we apply an extractor, we can use new blocks of X and Y . Idea 3: However, even with a linear seeded extractor, the pre-image size for different seeds may not be the same. For example, if we have a linear seeded extractor that outputs m bits from an n-bit input, then one can show that for most seeds the pre-image size is 2 n−m , while for some seed the pre-image size can be 2 n . If we just uniformly sample the seed and uniformly sample the pre-image given the seed, then the overall distribution is not uniform over the entire pre-image, due to the above mentioned size difference. To rectify this, we construct a new linear seeded extractor iExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m with m = d/2 that works for entropy rate 0.9 sources. Moreover iExt has the property that given any output, the pre-image size for any seed is the same. The idea is as follows. We first take 0.1d bits from the seed and use an average sampler to sample 0.9d distinct bits from the source. Since we are using a sampler and the source has entropy rate 0.9, an argument in [43] shows that with high probability conditioned on the 0.1d bits of the seed, the sampled 0.9d bits from the source also has entropy rate roughly 0.9. Now we take the rest 0.9 bits of the seed and the sampled 0.9d bits from the source and apply the inner product two-source extractor (or just use leftover hash lemma), which can output d/2 uniform random bits. The point is that given any output and any fixed seed, the pre-image of the inner product part has the same size, 2 and now the pre-image of any sampled bits also have the same size (since the pre-image is just the sampled bits adding any possible choice of the other n − 0.9d bits).
Note that each time we apply iExt, the output length becomes half of the seed length. Thus in the alternating extraction if we start with seed length d, then after one sub step of alternating extraction, the output length will become Ω(d) since the sub step takes at most 2 rounds. However we can compensate for this loss by taking several new blocks of Y , apply iExt using the same seed and then concatenate the outputs. This works because the blocks of Y form a block source, and iExt is a strong seeded extractor.
Idea 4: Now given any output, our sampling strategy is as follows. We first uniformly generate X1 and Y1, and compute V = IP(X1, Y1). Then we know which bits of the codeword we are sampling. We then uniformly generate these sampled bits X2, Y2 and thus we obtain Z. Now we uniformly generate all the intermediate random variables produced in alternating extractions. Based on Z and these variables, we can now generate all the blocks of X and Y used.
This almost works except for the following problem. The blocks of X and Y generated must also satisfy the linear equations imposed by X2, Y2, which are the bits sampled from the an linear encodings of X and Y using an error correcting code. However, it is unclear what is the dependence between the linear equations imposed by X2, Y2 and the other linear equations that we obtain earlier. Of course, if they are linearly independent then we are in good shape.
To solve this problem, our crucial observation is that if is small enough and the number of blocks of X and Y is large enough, then the entire alternating extraction steps only consume say half of the bits of X and Y . Thus, whatever linear equations we obtain from these steps only impose constraints to the first half bits of X and Y . Therefore, we can hope that even after fixing these bits, the linear equations imposed by X2, Y2 will still be linearly independent due to the other half of unfixed bits.
We indeed succeed with this idea. More specifically, we are going to divide the rest of X and Y (the parts excluding X1 and Y1, which has length n−n Ω(1) ) into chunks of length b = log n . We will now view each chunk as an element in the field F 2 b . We then take say 0.9n bits and view it as a string in F 0.9n/b . We can now use Reed-Solomn code (RS-code for short) in F 2 b to encode this string into a codeword in F 2 b
. Note that 2 b > n > 0.9n/b, so this encoding is feasible, and it has distance rate (2 b − 0.9n/b)/(2 b ) > 0.9. Now, instead of using V = IP(X1, Y1) to sample n Ω(1) bits, we will sample n Ω(1) field elements from the encoding of X and Y , and then view them as bit strings. Since the RScode has distance rate 0.9, again we have that if two strings are different, then with probability 1 − 2 −n Ω(1)
, the sampled strings of their encodings will also be different. Moreover, the sampled bit string now has length roughly n Ω(1) log n, which is still small enough. Now the alternating extraction steps only impose constraints for the first half bits of X and Y , so any fixing of these bits can be viewed equivalently as fixing the first 0.5n/b field elements in a message. Thus we are still left with 0.4n/b free field elements, and we have n Ω(1) linear equations in F 2 b according to the RS-code. As long as the number of free variables is larger than the number of equations (i.e., 0.4n/b > n Ω(1) ), the property of the RS-encoding ensures that this set of linear equations are linearly independent. Thus, for any fixed first half bits of X and Y , the pre-image according to the linear equations imposed by the sampled bits X2, Y2 has the same size. Now we are basically done. Note that the "flip-flop" alternating extraction has a symmetric manner, i.e., no matter each bit of z is 0 or 1, we will use two sub steps of alternating extraction, with each step taking two rounds of alternating extraction. Also note that for any seed the pre-image of iExt always has the same size. Together with the above argument about RS-codes, this implies that given any output, for any fixing of Z = z and any fixing of the intermediate random variables, the pre-image has the same size. Thus we can uniformly sample from the pre-image by first uniformly generating Z and all intermediate random variables, and then uniformly sample from the pre-image given them.
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
We use capital letters to denote distributions and their support, and corresponding small letters to denote a sample from the source. Let [m] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , m}, and Ur denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} r . For a string x of length m, define the string Slice(x, w) to be the prefix of length w of x. For any i ∈ [m], let x {i} denote the symbol in the i'th co-ordinate of x, and for any T ⊆ [m], let x {T } denote the projection of x to the co-ordinates indexed by T .
Min Entropy, Flat Distributions
The min-entropy of a source X is defined to be H∞(X) = min s∈support(X) {1/ log(Pr[X = s])}. A distribution (source) D is flat if it is uniform over a set S. A (n, k)-source is a distribution on {0, 1} n with min-entropy k. It is a well known fact that any (n, k)-source is a convex combination of flat sources supported on sets of size 2 k .
Statistical Distance, Convex Combination of Distributions and Probability Lemmas
Definition 3.1 (Statistical distance). Let D1 and D2 be two distributions on a set S. The statistical distance between D1 and D2 is defined to be:
Definition 3.2. A distribution D on a set S is a convex combination of distributions D1, . . . , D l on S if there exists non-negative constants (called weights) w1, . . . , w with l i=1 wi = 1 such that Pr[D = s] = l i=1 wi · Pr[Di = s] for all s ∈ S. We use the notation D = l i=1 wi · Di to denote the fact that D is a convex combination of the distributions D1, . . . , D with weights w1, . . . , w . Definition 3.3. For random variables X and Y , we use X|Y to denote a random variable with distribution:
We record the following lemma which follows from the above definitions.
Seeded and Seedless Extractors
Definition 3.5 (Strong seeded extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is called a strong seeded extractor for min-entropy k and error if for any (n, k)-source X and an independent uniformly random string U d , we have
where Um is independent of U d . Further if the function Ext(·, u) is a linear function over F2 for every u ∈ {0, 1} d , then Ext is called a linear seeded extractor.
Definition 3.6 (Independent Source Extractor).
A function IExt : ({0, 1} n ) t → {0, 1} m is an extractor for independent (n, k) sources that uses t sources and outputs m bits with error , if for any t independent (n, k) sources X1, X2, · · · , Xt, we have |IExt(X1, X2, · · · , Xt) − Um| ≤ .
In the special case where t = 2, we say IExt is a two-source extractor. We recall some results on conditional min-entropy from [16] . It is sometimes convenient to work with average case seeded extractors, where if a source X has average case conditional min-entropyH∞(X|Z) ≥ k then the output of the extractor is uniform even when Z is given. Lemma 3.10 ( [16] ). For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, )extractor then it is also a (k + log 1 δ , + δ) average case extractor.
Conditional Min-entropy
The following result on conditional min-entropy was proved in [36] . We also need the following lemma from [31] .
Lemma 3.12. Let X, Y be random variables with supports S, T ⊆ V such that (X, Y ) is -close to a distribution with min-entropy k. Further suppose that the random variable Y can take at most values. Then Pr y∼Y (X|Y = y) is 2 1/2 -close to a source with min-entropy
Somewhere Random Sources
Definition 3.13. A source X is a t × k somewhere random source if it comprises of t rows on {0, 1} k such that at least one of the rows is uniformly distributed. The rows may have arbitrary correlations among themselves.
Some Known Extractor Constructions
We use explicit constructions of strong linear seeded extractors [42] [40] . The following is an explicit construction of a strong seeded extractor with optimal parameters [25] . We use the following strong seeded extractor constructed by Zuckerman [45] that achieves seed length log(n)+O(log( 1 )) to extract from any source with constant min-entropy. We recall a folklore construction of a two-source extractors based on the inner product function [11] . We include a proof for completeness. Theorem 3.17 ([11] ). For all m, r > 0, with q = 2 m , n = rm, let X, Y be independent sources on F r q with minentropy k1, k2 respectively. Let IP be the inner product function over the field Fq. Then, we have:
AN EXPLICIT SEEDED NON-MALLEABLE EXTRACTOR AT POLYLOGARITHMIC MIN-ENTROPY
We first set up some tools that we use in our extractor construction.
Averaging Samplers
In our contsruction, we need to pseudorandomly sample a subset T in [n] such that it intersects any large enough subset with high probability. It turns out that a stronger sampling problem has been extensively studied with the following stronger requirement: For any function f : [n] → [0, 1], the average of f on the sampled subset T is close to its actual mean with high probability. Such sampling procedures are known as averaging samplers. We use the definition from [43] . 
Samp has distinct samples if for every x ∈ {0, 1} r , the samples produced by Samp(x) are all distinct.
The following theorem proved by Zuckerman [44] essentially shows that seeded extractors are equivalent to averaging samplers. Using known constructions of strong seeded extractors, we have the following corollary. Further Samp has distinct samples.
Proof. We set the parameter α as follows. Let Ext :
, 1} m be the strong linear seeded extractor for min-entropy k = n α 2 and error = δ 2 from Theorem 3.14. Thus t = 2 d = O(n αc ) for some constant c. We choose α < νSamp small enough such that cα < νsamp (and set β = cα). The result now follows by using Theorem 4.2.
Alternating Extraction
We recall the method of alternating extraction, which we use as a crucial component in our construction.
The alternating extraction protocol takes in two integer parameters u, m > 0. Assume that there are two parties, Quentin with a source Q and a uniform seed S1 (which may be correlated with Q), and Wendy with source W . Further suppose that (Q, S1) is kept as a secret from Wendy and W is kept a secret from Quentin.The protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and Wendy, and runs for u steps.
Let Extq, Extw be strong seeded extractors. In the first step, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R1 = Extw(X, S1) and sends it back to Quentin, and Quentin then computes S2 = Extq(Q, R1). Continuing in this way, in step i, Quentin sends Si, Wendy computes the random variables Ri = Extw(X, Si) and sends it to Quentin, and Quentin then computes the random variable Si+1 = Extq(Q, Ri). This is done for u steps. Each of the random variables Ri, Si is of length m. Thus, the following sequence of random variables is generated: S1, R1 = Extw(X, S1), S2 = Extq(Q, R1), . . . , Su = Extq(Q, Ru−1), Ru = Extw(X, Su).
Look-Ahead Extractor We define the following lookahead extractor:
laExt(X, (Q, S1)) = R1, . . . , Ru
In our application of the alternating extraction protocol, the initial seed S1 is not guaranteed to be uniform but only has high min-entropy 3 . We first prove a lemma which shows that strong seeded extractors work even when the seed is not uniform but has high enough min-entropy. 
Proof. Since Y is a source with min-entropy d − λ, we can assume it is uniform on a set A of size 2 d−λ . Thus
where the last inequality uses the fact that Ext is a strong seeded extractor.
Notation: If Za, Za+1, . . . , Z b are random variables, we use Z [a,b] to denote the random variable Za, . . . , Z b .
We now prove a general lemma which establishes a strong property satisfied by the alternating extraction protocol. The proof uses ideas from a result proved by Li on alternating extraction [32] , and in fact generalizes this result.
Lemma 4.5. Let X be a (nw, kw)-source and let X (1) , . . . , X (t) be random variables on {0, 1} nw that are arbitrarily correlated with X. Let Y = (Q, S1), Y (1) = (Q (1) , S
(1) 1 ), . . . , Y (t) = 3 another way to handle this is to use the extractor from [39] , but we avoid this to ensure invertibility of the final extractor.
(Q (t) , S (t) 1 ) be arbitrarily correlated random variables that are independent of (X, X (1) , X (2) , . . . , X (t) ). Suppose that Q is a (nq, kq)-source, S1 is a (m, m−λ)-source, Q (1) , . . . , Q (t) are each on nq bits, and S (1) , . . . , S (t) are each on m bits. Let Extq, Extw be strong seeded extractors that extract m bits at min-entropy k with error and seed length m. Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor for an alternating extraction protocol with parameters u, m, with Extq, Extw being the strong seeded extractors used by Quentin and Wendy respectively. Let laExt(X, Y ) = R1, . . . , Ru and for j ∈ [t], laExt(X (j) , Y (j) ) = R (j) 1 , . . . , R (j) u . If kw, kq ≥ k + u(t + 1)m + 2 log( 1 ), then the following holds for each i ∈ [u]:
Due to lack of space, we refer the reader to the full version for a proof of Lemma 4.5.
Construction of Some Key Components
In this section, we construct functions which are key ingredients in all our explicit extractor constructions. It is based on a new way of using the technique of alternating extraction, and is inspired by a recent elegant work of Cohen [12] on constructing local correlation breakers.
We define the following function which is inspired by the "flip-flop" method introduced by Cohen [12] .
We now prove the following lemma. 
. Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1} + 10 jnq + jm + log 1 , kw ≥ k+10 jm + log 1 , and nq ≥ k+10jm+2 log( 1 )+λ.
Then with probability at least 1 − , where = O(2 λ ), over the fixing of the random variables Qi, {Q Due to lack of space, we refer the reader to the full version for a proof of Lemma 4.5.
We now construct a function that is a crucial ingredient in our non-malleable extractor construction. (Recall that for any string z, we use z {h} to denote the symbol in the h'th co-ordinate of z.) Algorithm 1: 2laExt(x, y, qi, b) Input: Bit strings x, y, qi of length nw, ny, nq respectively, and a bit b. Output: A bit string of length nq. Subroutine: Let Extq : {0, 1} nq × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from minentropy k with error and seed length m. Let Extw : {0, 1} nw × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from min-entropy k with error and seed length d. Let laExt : {0, 1} nw × {0, 1} nq +m → {0, 1} 2m be the look ahead extractors defined in Section 4.2 for an alternating extraction protocol with parameters m, u = 2 (recall u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random variable that is communicated between the players), and using Extq, Extw as the strong seeded extractors. Let Ext : {0, 1} ny × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} nq be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from min-entropy k1 with error .
1 Let si,1 = Slice(qi, m) 2 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,1, ri,2 3 if b = 0, let qi = Ext(y, ri,1) 4 else let qi = Ext(y, ri,2) 5 endif 6 Let si,1 = Slice(qi, m). 7 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,1, ri,2. 8 if b = 0, let qi+1 = Ext(y, ri,2) 9 else let qi+1 = Ext(y, ri,1) 10 endif 11 Ouput qi+1. Lemma 4.7. Let z, z (1) , . . . , z (t) each be bit strings such that for all i ∈ [t], z = z (i) . Let X be a (nw, kw)-source and let X (1) , . . . , X (t) be random variables on {0, 1} nw that are arbitrarily correlated with X. Let Y, Y (1) , , . . . , Y (t) be random variables on ny bits that are independent of (X, X (1) , X (2) , . . . , X (t) ). Suppose that Y is a (ny, ky)-source, ky = ny − λ.
Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2. Let nmExt1(X, Y, z) = Q +1 , and for h ∈ [t], let nmExt1(X (h) , Y (h) , z (h) ) = Q (h) +1 . Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1} + 20 tnq + tm + log 1 , kw ≥ k+20 tm + log 1 and nq ≥ k+10tm+2 log( 1 )+λ. Then, we have Q +1 , Q For h ∈ [ ], define the sets
We record a simple claim. 
are independent (d) X has min-entropy at least kw − 10h tm + log 1 > k + 10 tm + log 1 and Y has min-entropy at least ky − 10h tnq + tm + log 1 > max{k, k1} + 10 tnq + tm + log 1 .
Then, the following holds: Let h+1 = h +c2 λ for some constant c. With probability at least 1− h+1 over the fixing of the random variables {Qi :
The random variables (X, {X (j) : j ∈ [t]}) and (Y, {Y (j) : j ∈ [t]}) are independent (d) X has min-entropy at least kw − 10(h + 1) tm + log 1 and Y has min-entropy at least ky − 10(h + 1) tm + log 1 .
Proof. We fix the random variables {Qi : : j ∈ Ind [h] }, noting that they are deterministic functions of X. Thus X has min-entropy at least kw − 10h jm + log 1 − tm − log 1 with probabilitiy at least 1 − . Further, Q has min-entropy at least ky − 10h tnq + tm + log 1 . The claim now follows directly from Lemma 4.6.
To complete the proof of Lemma 4.7, we now note that the hypothesis of Claim 4.9 is indeed satisfied when h = 0. Thus, by applications of Claim 4.9, it follows that the Q +1 isclose to Un q , where = O(2 λ + ). This follows since for all applications of Claim 4.9 except the first time, Q h is h -close to uniform, and hence the parameter λ = 0. This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.7.
Our Construction of a Seeded Non-malleable Extractor
We now proceed to present our construction of an explicit seeded non-malleable extractor for polylogarithmic min-entropy. Subroutines and Parameters 1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one.
Let t, k, d be parameters such that t ≤ k γ/2 .
2. Let n1 = log tn . Let Exts : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 1 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy 2n1 and error 2 −Ω(n 1 ) . 4. Let ExtSamp : {0, 1} n 1 × {0, 1} d 1 → {0, 1} n 2 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.16 set to extract from min-entropy n 1 2 with error 1 20 and output length n2, such that N2D1 = d α , where N2 = 2 n 2 and D1 = 2 d 1 . Let {0, 1} d 1 = {s1, . . . , sD 1 }. Define Samp : {0, 1} n 1 → [ d α ] D 1 as: Samp(x) = (Ext(x, s1) • s1, . . . , Ext(x, sD 1 ) • sD 1 ). By Theorem 3.16, we have D1 = c1n1, for some constant c1.
Let
5. Let = n1 + D1 = (c1 + 1)n1. 6 . We set up the parameters for the components used by 2laExt (computed by Algorithm 1) as follows.
(a) Let n3 = c3t , n4 = 10 , for some large enough constant c3. Let Extq : {0, 1} n 3 × {0, 1} n 4 → {0, 1} n 4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy kq = n 3 4 with error = 2 −Ω(n 4 ) . Let Extw : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n 4 → {0, 1} n 4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy k 2 with error = 2 −Ω(n 4 ) .
(b) Let laExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n 3 +n 4 → {0, 1} 2n 4 be the look ahead extractor used by 2laExt. Recall that the parameters in the alternating extraction protocol are set as m = n4, u = 2 where u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random variable that is communicated between the players, and Extq, Extw are the strong seeded extractors used in the protocol.
(c) Let Ext : {0, 1} d × {0, 1} n 4 → {0, 1} n 3 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy d 2 with seed length n4 and error 2 −Ω(n 4 ) . 7. Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2, which uses the function 2laExt set up as above.
8. Let n5 = k 100t . Let Ext1 : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n 4 → {0, 1} n 5 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy k 4 with seed length n4, error 2 −Ω(n 4 ) .
Algorithm 3: snmExt(x,y) Input: Bit strings x, y, of length n, d respectively. Output: A bit string of length n4. 1 y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute v = Exts(x, y1). 2 Compute T = Samp(v) ⊂ [ n α ]. 3 Let z = y1 • y2 where y2 = (E(y)) {T } . 4 Output Ext1(x, nmExt1(x, y, z)).
We now state our main theorem.
Theorem 4.10. Let snmExt : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} d → {0, 1} n 5 be the function computed by Algorithm 4. Then snmExt satisfies the following property: For any > 0, k ≥ C log 2+γ n , t ≤ k γ/2 and d ≥ Ct 2 log 2 n , if X is a (n, k)-source, and Y is an independent and uniform distribution on {0, 1} d , and A1 . . . , At are arbitrary tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ [t], Ai has no fixed points, then the following holds:
|snmExt(X, Y ), snmExt(X, A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X, At(Y )), Y − Un 5 , snmExt(X, A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X, At(Y )), Y | ≤ O( ), Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X, Y ), let V (i) denote the random variable H(X, Ai(Y )).
Proof. We first prove the following claim. Proof. Pick an arbitrary i ∈ [t]. If Y1 = Y (i) 1 , then we have Z = Z (i) . Now suppose Y1 = Y (i) 1 . We fix Y1, and note that since Exts is a strong extractor (Theorem 3.17), B is 2 −Ω(n 1 ) -close to Un 1 .
Since Ai has no fixed points, it follows that since E is an encoder of a code with relative distance distance 1 10 ,
10α . Using Theorem 4.2, it follows that with probability at least 1 − , |D ∩ Samp(V )| ≥ 1, and thus Y2 = Y (i) 2 (since Samp(V ) = Samp(V (i) )). The claim now follows by a simple union bound.
We fix Z, Z (1) , . . . , Z (t) such that Z = Z (i) for any i ∈ [t] (from the lemma above, this occurs with probability 1 − ). We note that by the Lemma 4.11 and Lemma 3.11, the source X has min-entropy at least k − 2n1 and the source Y has min-entropy at least d − 2 with probability at least 1 − . Theorem 4.10 now follows directly from Lemma 4.7 by noting that the following hold by our choice of parameters:
• d 2 > 20 (t(n3 + n4) + log( 1 ))
